Legal and Ethical Problems in the Provision of Medical Care. I ** by Shindell, Sidney
Department of Social and Preventive
SIDNEY SHINDELL Medicine, University of Pittsburgh
School of Medicine
LEGAL AND ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE PROVISION OF MEDICAL CARE. I**
ETHICAL STANDARDS AND SOCIETAL NORMS
A profession is distinguished from a trade or business in that it is said
to possess a self-governing system of ethical standards above and apart
from the norms of society as a whole. Medicine, being a profession, has a
formal code of ethics, ancient in its origin and consistent in its application,
which stands as a guide for conduct when dealing with (a) other members
of the profession and (b) with the public.
That portion of our ethical code which deals with doctor-doctor relation-
ships seldom comes under discussion. It works well generally and is not
usually thought of when we talk about ethical "problems." That portion,
however, which deals with doctor-patient relationships is fraught with
enough difficulty to warrant devoting these lectures to their consideration.
One might ask why the ethical standards of a profession should ever
create problems. It may be that society as a whole does not understand our
standards; it may be that our code of ethics does not conform to the be-
havioral norm of the society in which we live, or it may be that our
ethical code does not address itself to the questions that the public considers
important. I think it is unlikely that there is real misunderstanding between
the public and ourselves; hence, it seems to me important to see where we
either do not conform to the societal norm or simply do not address our-
selves to issues of importance to the public.
In order to do this, I propose to divide the subject matter of my lecture
somewhat arbitrarily. I should like to attempt an examination of our
profession's standards and the norms of society in general, and conduct this
examination in two ways. First, I would like to deal with the one-to-one
relationship of the individual physician and the individual patient to see
where the standards of our profession and the norms of society impinge
and to see what problems arise from this impingement. Then I should
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like to look at the broader relationship of the profession to society for
the same purpose. In discussing the individual patient-individual physician
relationship I shall touch on the essential nature of the relationship from
the point of view of its interpersonal and legal components, describe
briefly a few of the civil duties which arise from the relationship, and
conclude with a consideration of the current status of the care of the
chronically ill. This last topic will lead us to a brief consideration of
one aspect of the broader profession-society relationship: a consideration
of current proposals for the provision and financing of medical care. In
the following lecture, we shall return to the individual doctor-individual
patient relationship in very special circumstances and we shall consider
the use of human beings as experimental subjects and of the maintenance
of life in its terminal stages.
In all of this I shall be attempting to examine the question I posed: i.e.,
whether the ethical standards of the medical profession either do not con-
form to the cultural norms of the society in which we live, or fail to
address themselves to questions of importance to the public.
Our first task is to define what the terms mean. We shall be considering
ethics, we shall be considering rules of law, and we shall be considering
cultural norms. A few moments, then, to place all of these within a single
framework would seem to be in order (Fig. 1).
All attitudes are manifested by behavior, and all behavior elicits some
reaction from society, depending upon the relative position of that behavior
on the scale of deviation from the societal norm. What we call "unethical"
elicits a reaction of disapproval, and what we call "illegal" is met with a
reaction which involves more formal sanction. An infraction of what we
call our civil law is expected to be dealt with by recompense, and an in-
fraction of what we call the criminal law is expected to be dealt with by
some form of restraint.
On such a scale of behavior, one should expect an ethical standard to
be closer to the norm than an infringement of a rule of civil law. Sutherland,
in his excellent monograph, The Law and One Man Among Many,' sug-
ests validly that the societal pressures, short of invoking the legal structure,
are much more important in determining individual behavior within a
group than the legal structure itself. I would suggest that the legal structure
exists to deal with the failures of (and the anxieties produced because of
the failure of) the usual societal pressures of approval and disapproval,
ostracism and emulation, criticism and respect. I would suggest also that if
an ethical standard is to be any standard at all, it should be positioned
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In questioning whether the ethical standards of the medical profession
conform to the cultural norms of society, we shall in effect be looking at
the point on the scale where specific behavior falls. If we find, for example,
that a standard of behavior acceptable to the medical profession falls
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shall be forced to conclude that our so-called ethical standards exist on
a scale different from the over-all societal values.
We shall engage in this examination by looking largely at the one-to-one
relationship of physician and patient as I have indicated. Since you are
obviously aware of the standard within the profession for acceptable
behavior, I suspect it shall largely be my task to try to describe the societal
norm, and the comparison of the two will then become apparent.
THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP AS A CONTRACT
As a starting point, I'd like to try to dissect the basic physician-patient
relationship. When a patient seeks to obtain the services of a physician,
he enters into the class of relationships which our society calls a contract.
To make this contract, a societal concern is implied with the right of an
individual to enter into a relationship, and with obligations which arise
from such a relationship. One of the norms of our society is that people
be bound by their agreements and that they be expected to perform in ac-
cordance with their agreements.
In interpersonal relationships either one person imposes his will upon the
other or both are free to make independent decisions. Hence, to have the
status to enter into an agreement implies an equality of parties. As a society
we have formalized the right of persons to contract and have defined the
relationship with a system of rules. A contract is said to exist when several
things occur. There is:
a) an offer to enter into an agreement made and communicated to
another;
b) this offer must be accepted and the acceptance communicated;
c) the parties must be competent to contract;
d) the agreement must deal with a lawful object if one expects the
aid of society in its enforcement; and
e) some item of value must pass between the parties.
One could not hope to expand upon the implications of each of these
seemingly simple statements in this discussion. Let me briefly describe,
however, how these requirements enter into the typical physician-patient
agreement. A physician in practice is like a merchant in a store. The
merchant has a commodity to sell and when he displays his wares he
is in effect inviting an offer. He is not bound to accept any offer made to
him, however. For example, if the only item of a particular model he has
left is the one on display, he may decline to accept the offer of a customer
to purchase it. He may make a counter-offer to order an identical item,
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but he has declined the specific offer of his potential customer. Similarly
a physician in practice is inviting an offer to engage his services. He too
can decline an offer which is made. He can do so, for example, on the
basis that the patient's problem is not within his area of specialization.
An obvious corollary to the principle that people are free to contract is
that people are also free not to contract.
Should a contract come into being because of acceptance of a valid
offer, then both parties are bound to perform their portion of the agreement.
The merchant is bound to deliver the merchandise contracted for. The
physician is bound to render the service contracted for. And the customer
(or patient) is bound to make the agreed upon compensation either for
the article or service, that item of value passing between them. Should a
physician fail to perform the services he promised to render, he would be
deemed to have breached his agreement. Society has chosen to provide
recompense to a person who suffers damage as a result of such a
breach.
What is meant by failure to perform a contract for medical services? A
few examples of nonperformance on the part of physicians will suffice.
The most obvious is that of abandonment. Once having undertaken to
care for a patient, a physician may not terminate his services unless he
has given reasonable opportunity for a patient to arrange for another
source of care. Hence, failure to respond to a call from a patient to whom
you have been giving care, or leaving for vacation without providing
"coverage" can lead to liability for breach of contract. Similarly an
obstetrical group that contracts for one of its members to be present at
the time of delivery is unable to enforce payment of its bill if the on-duty
man is unable to attend the patient and a resident is substituted instead.
There is also a case in which damages were awarded a woman who had
specifically agreed with her physician that her baby would be delivered by
Caesarean section which he failed to do. She had had two previous preg-
nancies result in still-births and brought suit when again she was delivered
of a stillborn child after her physician had let the opportunity to perform
a Caesarean section pass without doing as he had previously agreed.
Physicians have also been successfully sued for failure to obtain a specific
result contracted for. This is most common when rash promises are made
as to the future appearance of a remodeled nose.
These suits that I mention are suits for breach of contract-failure to
perform services agreed upon. This has nothing to do with quality of prac-
tice or standard of care. Our society simply says it will enforce contracts
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and that a physician-patient contract is a contract in the usual commercial
sense.
OBLIGATIONS ARISING INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT
Now it is also true that by virtue of the physician-patient association
some obligations arise completely independent of the contract. These too,
however, are dictated by society. Some of the obligations are those which
all members of society owe to all others; the physician-patient relation-
ship simply provides the opportunity for contact between the individual.
An example of this obligation is the duty we owe to exercise reasonable
care to avoid injury to others. We must thus conduct our motor vehicles
with reasonable care to avoid injury to other drivers, pedestrians, and
property. We must exercise care in the maintenance of our premises to
avoid injury to persons invited upon the premises. We must also do
nothing to place a person in apprehension of bodily harm nor may we
touch another person in such a fashion that he may suffer harm or hurt.
We may not injure the reputation or invade the privacy of another. These
are simply standards of conduct in interpersonal relationships which
recognize the juridical equality of all individuals.
Hence when we engage in the practice of medicine and have contact with
a patient, we not only engage in a contractual relationship but also must
deal with the duty to avoid hurt or harm. Because on occasion we must
cause pain or hurt, it is required that the patient affirmatively relinquish
his right, and give us consent to do what may be medically indicated. But
blanket consent to do anything we wish (or even feel might be advisable)
is not considered appropriate. The patient has the right to know specifically
what he is consenting to. Since the patient has the right to engage our
services, he has the right to refuse our services or to choose which
services he desires, or to select the manner in which he'd like the services
performed. In eliciting his consent, we are required to appraise him
sufficiently of what we propose, why we propose it, what are the risks and
the like, so that he may make an intelligent decision. We can negotiate,
but we have no right to dictate. We are dealing with a free agent. In-
creasingly our courts are saying that any consent obtained must be
"informed."
We must also bring to the professional services we render a standard
of care (meaning carefulness) which could reasonably be expected from
other members of the medical community. Failure to exercise such care
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is negligence, and since 1794 patients in this country have been afforded
the right to recover financially for damage resulting from a breach of this
duty.
Thus far I have only described the norm, and alluded to the legal
remedies for injury which results from deviation from the norm of behavior.
How then does the medical profession's view of the relationship differ
from the societal norm? While society looks upon the relationship as a
mutually beneficial agreement between two equal parties, the medical
profession tends to view the relationship in somewhat different light.
Drawing on the analysis of Szasz and Hollender,2 we can describe the
relationship as generally taking three forms: that of "Activity-Passivity,"
"Guidance-Cooperation," or "Mutual Participation." The activity- passivity
model is described as "not really an interaction, because it is based on the
effect of one person on another." In this situation, the physician is the
authority figure. Such a relationship "originated in-and is entirely appro-
priate for-the treatment of emergencies." The guidance-cooperation model
is one which "the patient is expected to 'look up to' and 'obey' his doctor ;"
and is the norm in less desperate situations than the medical emergency.
The mutual participation model occurs when both physician and patient
consider each other equals and is described by these authors as essentially
foreign to medical practice, yet "fundamental to the social structure of
democracy."
What is the significance of the fact that the societal concept of the
physician-patient relationship differs from that of the medical norm? Let
us suppose the doctor does look at his position vts-a-vts the patient in a
different fashion. What is the effect of this difference in viewpoint? For
one thing it results in conflict, and to illustrate the points of conflict, I
have selected two specific examples. Not only may the physician tend to
forget that he is dealing with a person who has certain rights, and
find himself liable to suit for breach of contract or acting without consent,
but he is also faced with two very special problems which have arisen
in recent years and which are matters of current concern. I refer specifically
to the "Good Samaritan" Laws and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. These
are both instances in which the public did not like the norm of the
medical profession and did something about it. In neither case do I propose
to examine in any depth the reason for the norm within the medical pro-
fession, but I only want to point out what the norm was to show that
it was at variance with the expectations of the public.
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GOOD SAMARITAN LAWS
Recalling that the physician-patient relationship is a contract that may
be freely entered into or avoided by either party, let us change the cir-
cumstances a bit from the typical situation I described. Let us suppose a
physician is in his office and an injured person is brought in. The physician
has the legal right to refuse to enter into a professional relationship. He
could tell the patient or the one who brought him in to go elsewhere; he
could offer to call an ambulance. However, both we and society would
consider it our obligation to render what aid we could before arranging
for other care. We would consider that our special status imposes special
obligations. Such a feeling was confirmed in a recent situation in New
York in which an internist was severely sanctioned for failing to give
emergency attention to a gun-shot victim.
Let us change the locale, though, from our office to the roadside. What
has changed? We still have the moral obligation to deal with emergencies;
it is still expected by the public that we will, and yet there has grown up
within the medical profession a generally agreed upon custom to avoid
being involved in this situation. What is behind this custom? It is true
that if one stops, he is inconvenienced. Usually, if we are driving along
the road we are going somewhere and want to get there. To stop means to
delay. But to go beyond this, people have asked whether a physician-
patient relationship would come into being if we stopped and ministered
to the injured. If so, and we failed to accompany the patient to the
hospital, would we be deemed to have abandoned the patient? If we
rendered care, would we be held to a standard of care prevalent among
the general medical community regardless of our specialty? These are some
of the principal questions that have been raised.
It may surprise you to know that careful search of legal precedent by
many people interested in this problem has failed to uncover a single
case in which a physician has been sued either for abondonment or for
negligence under these circumstances. Yet few physicians are willing to
expose themselves to the theoretical possibility. Increasingly physicians
are avoiding identification on their automobiles in part so they will not
be stopped by police at the scene of accidents. The public has become
increasingly aware that physicians are not at all likely to be available to
give first aid at roadside accidents unless specifically summoned, and
even then, difficulty in finding a doctor is frequently encountered.
Reaction on the part of the public to this circumstance occurred. People
are unhappy about the fact that should they be involved in an accident
the chance of receiving professional care at a critical moment is limited.
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This, of course, leads to some anxiety over the effect of nonavailability of
physicians on the possibility for survival. The public reaction consisted
of an attempt to induce physicians to make themselves available by cloak-
ing the physician with immunity from suit in order to increase his
willingness to act under these circumstances. Hence, the Good Samaritan
Law, which prevents suits either for abandonment or negligence against
physicians who render care in emergency situations. Some states extend
this immunity to physicians serving on emergency call panels, some to
other professional personnel, like nurses. The first such act was passed
in 1959. Eight states had adopted one by 1961 and five more in 1962.
In 1963 no fewer than 32 states had bills introduced, 12 of which adopted
them and three liberalized their bills to extend protection beyond physicians.
Hence, in four years, half the states enacted the law.
Interestingly enough Govenor Kerner vetoed the act passed by the Illinois
legislature last year,
(a) as unnecessary since he could neither find nor conceive of the courts
entertaining such a suit against a doctor, and
(b) because he felt that doctors should not require an inducement to
perform their moral duty.
Regardless of the merits of his contention, the failure of physicians to
respond to certain situations represents a departure from the norm of
behavior as defined by the society in which we live; society took steps to
reduce this disparity.
THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR
The other example I wish to mention is one in which the displeasure of
the public has resulted in placing the physician at a distinct disadvantage.
We are a society living within a legal system that we do not like to see
flaunted. For example, we grant the right (and consider it a social benefit)
for a person to recover financially from any "damage" that results from
injury. This is infinitely better, we think, than killing people who injure
us in retribution, or limiting retribution to a similar injury, (an eye for an
eye) or exacting "satisfaction" by fighting a duel. Our children may con-
sider our current method equally absurd, but it is our current standard.
We conduct a trial to determine liability and award a money judgment
designed to compensate for the injury suffered. We attempt to arrive at a
just determination by requiring a formal presentation of evidence on both
the issue of liability and the issue of damage.
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In the case of injuries resulting from negligence in professional practice,
our society further requires that evidence of standard of care or breach of
this standard must be given only by a physician. But what happens if no
physician will provide this evidence? Courts considering themselves faced
with what they termed a "conspiracy of silence" on the part of the medical
profession were confronted with three alternative methods of attempting
to overcome the effect of noncooperation:
a) force doctors to testify, i.e., issue a subpoena and punish for contempt
if evidence was not given, (this is obviously abhorrent to the norms of our
society.)
b) eliminate the necessity for professional testimony by letting the jury,
without professional evidence, establish standards of care from its own lay
experience, (this was considered too radical and illogical a departure
that would substitute emotion for rationality in arriving at a decision.)
or,
c) presume negligence from the result and require the doctor to rebut it.
The last method is the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur-"the thing speaks for
itself." What does it mean to have to rebut a presumption? Here is an
example: If a child is born to a married woman, it is presumed to be a
product of the marriage, i.e., a child of the husband as well. The child in
fact could have been the product of another liaison. Hence, if it were
important to do so, the presumption that the child is really a product of
the marriage might be rebutted. A surgical instrument left in an abdomen
following a hysterectomy may similarly be presumed to have been left in
negligently. In most instances it would not be reasonable to attempt to
rebut this presumption. One could, however, conceive of a case in which
there has been a ruptured uterus and an emergency Caesarean section
with the mother in profound shock so that the most rapid procedure pos-
sible is done. In the course of such a procedure under these circumstances,
the leaving of clamps on the large vessels to be removed at a second stage
operation might well be justified. Evidence of these circumstances would
easily rebut the presumption that there was negligence in leaving an
instrument behind.
The net result of the requirement that under certain circumstances the
physician must rebut the presumption of negligence is to shift the burden
of evidence from the patient to the doctor. Under this doctrine a patient
need only come to court and show an injury, contend such an injury does
not ordinarily occur except when negligence is present, show that the matter
was under the exclusive control ofthe doctor, and then require the physician
to show how it did occur in spite of the exercise of due care on his part.
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Unless he can satisfy a lay jury that he had exercised an appropriate degree
of care, the plaintiff wins an award. Few states apply this doctrine with
any frequency to medical issues-generally, the plaintiff must still affirma-
tively show negligence on the part of the physician, but the fact that this
doctrine is being applied at all is an indication of public displeasure with
the conduct of the members of our profession, and it stands as the means
by which the public is dealing with this displeasure.
With these two examples, we have come to the point where the public
and the profession, having viewed the basic relationship in somewhat
different terms, also view either the failure to enter into the relationship
or the problem of legal sanction for improper conduct of the relationship
from different points of view. Since the legal system is created by and
modifiable by the behavioral standard of the public, we have seen two
instances in which reaction on the part of the public has resulted in change
of legal status of the profession. In one case, from the standpoint of the
profession, the change might be considered desirable; in the other, few
would disagree that it was an undesirable one. That either of these changes
were necessary, it seems to me, might well be a matter of professional
soul searching.
THE CARE OF THE CHRONICALLY ILL
I would like, therefore, to conclude this first segment with a view of
another topic about which there is a professional norm, public displeasure,
and as yet, unformulated reaction by the public. What I mean by "un-
formulated" is that we, as a society, have not as yet quite decided what we
want to do or how to do it, but the proposals to meet the issues comprise
the major portion of dialogue being conducted today between the profession
and the public. I refer, of course, to the problems of the care of the
chronically ill and aged.
I trust I will be forgiven if, in dealing with this topic, I indulge in a little
philosophical speculation, or maybe more properly in some psychiatric
self-analysis. For I would suggest that the problem both the physician and
the public face with chronic illnesses is frustration.
Let us look at the doctor's frustration first. It is the physician's task
as he sees it to reduce morbidity and delay mortality. With this objective,
the public has no argument. We are at a stage in medical knowledge,
however, where we are still limited in our ability to realize this objective.
Oliver Wendell Holmes observed not too long ago, "It is the physician's
privilege to cure seldom, to relieve often, to comfort always."
389VALE JOURNAL OF BIOLOGY AND MEDICINE
I'm not sure, however, that we can repeat Holmes' dictum today. We
have been forced with the advent of a few specifics, to divide disease into
two categories: those with which we deal quite successfully with relative
dispatch and those with which we do not. By definition almost, a chronic
disease is one in which we cure never and relieve rarely. Because of our
repeated successes with disease after disease, however, and because of the
procession of antibiotics, biologicals, and specific chemotherapeutic agents,
the public (and maybe we ourselves) have come to expect that we should
be able to affect the course of all disease. We might even be said to have
some problems with our limitations.
We are almost at the point where we can describe the application of
medical knowledge as Galen once described a wonderful medication. He
stated: "All who drink of this remedy recover in a short time, except
those whom it does not help, who all die. Therefore it is obvious that it
fails only in incurable cases."' May I paraphrase: All who receive good
medical care recover in a short time, except those whom we cannot help.
Therefore it is obvious we fail only in incurable cases. We even tend to
suggest that some of our incurable cases may not even have medical
problems-or at least we describe them as "not organic." We either
do not consider it a privilege "to comfort always," or find ourselves
unable to do so with the increased expectation the public has of the results
of our abilities. Alexander suggests that the profession has developed
"a certain amount of open contempt for people who cannot be rehabilitated
with current knowledge...."
I have often wondered to what extent the intellectually challenging games
we play in diagnosis are a retreat from our therapeutic limitations.
Similarly, to what extent is our preoccupation with research an acceptable
means by which to leave the arena where we would have to face the
problem of patient discomfort from disease and physician discomfort from
inability to modify disease? Here in the medical center we have the
additional problem of having to expose our feet of clay to our students. If
we find it difficult to admit our limitations to the public, and extremely
difficult to admit it to ourselves, the necessity to admit it to our students
would be intolerable. Hence, we avoid doing so by placing other values
above the very mundane task of bringing comfort to persons distressed by
illness.
While morbidity from disease is just a remote possibility, the public is
willing to support our efforts to uncover new knowledge in the hope of
finding answers by the time this potentiality becomes stark reality. So
we are all frantically and happily engaged in pursuing the will-of-the-wisp
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of research. I do not mean to condemn research, I merely wish to place it
in the position it holds vis-a-vis the understood objective society has for
its medical establishment. The public still values therapy for illness as
the one legitimate end of medicine with diagnosis a means to that end, and
research providing new knowledge to make that end more effective.
In this context there is little mystery why physical medicine (and re-
habilitation) as a new medical specialty rapidly captured the imagination
of the public yet developed little stature with the profession. Similarly
psychiatry, which attempts to deal with the emotional reaction to illness,
is considered of little moment to the clinician. Both these fields have dealt
with therapeutic objectives. The physiatrist says, in effect, let's not be
preoccupied with what has been lost, let's build on what remains. The
psychiatrist says, let's be satisfied with the attainment of limited goals.
This has resulted in the kind of public support that we know these fields
enjoy.
Two other effects stem from the public's expectations exceeding the pro-
fession's abilities. I would ascribe, as a principal factor in the rise of pro-
fessional liability suits, the disparity between the expectation of the patient
and the therapeutic result obtained. This I believe is why physicians con-
sider most suits to be unjustified. They know the limitation of medicine as
a whole. The public, on the other hand, expects a result on the basis of its
fantasy as to medicine's capabilities. Failure to obtain such a result must
obviously be due to the fact that the individual practitioner was not as
careful as he should have been. It is also why the good physicians get
sued. A physician is considered "good" when we have high expectations of
him. Failure to obtain expected results would not be ascribed to lack of
ability, but failure to exercise that ability. In terms of this logic, the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur that I mentioned earlier is easy to understand.
A result was expected. It didn't occur. It must have been due to negligence.
Prove to us, doctor, that it wasn't.
THE CURRENT DIALOGUE CONCERNING PAYMENT FOR CARE
The second effect of the disparity between expectation and results is
seen in proposals to "make medical care available" to the public. The logic
goes something like this: Doctors can cure disease. Doctors can cure disease
better if they find it early. One of the reasons people do not go early is
because they have to worry about the cost. People with low incomes have
poorer morbidity and mortality rates than those with high incomes. Hence,
to improve health we simply have to eliminate the financial barrier between
doctor and patient.
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Physicians counter with: Doctors cure what they can. No one is denied
medical care for lack of ability to pay. People may not want to spend their
money on medical care, which explains their not coming to doctors soon
enough. People who cannot work because of disability naturally earn less
money than those who do work; hence, low income is more likely to be a
result of illness than illness being a result of low income.
The public says: In providing medical care to people in need, the
resource should be looked on as a right. No one should have to go
without a basic necessity, or to have to suffer indignity in obtaining it.
The profession says: Since everyone is capable of getting the care they
need, it is only necessary for those few who need financial help to ask for
it and it shall be given. Few things come to us as a matter of right, and
medical care should be no different from food, clothing, and shelter. And
on and on.
It appears a bit paradoxical that while the physician looks at the pro-
fessional relationship between doctor and patient as one in which he is the
authoritarian and the patient the recipient, when it comes to financial
arrangements to provide care, the physician becomes ambivalent. He first
insists upon the patient having the status of an equal member of society
with freedom to contract and to make choices. When, however, the patient
is unable to purchase care on his own, he again tends to see the patient
in recipient status. The public, on the other hand, in keeping with its
attitude that the patient is the equal of the physician, feels that when in
need of help the patient should not have to assume recipient status. The
inconsistency in the public's position is in the view held by a segment of
the populace who hold that the members of the public should not have
to make a conscious choice to divert wealth to the purchase of medical
care at the expense of other commodities. A basic level of health, like a
basic level of education is considered a national resource, thus, in the public
interest, and therefore should not be a matter of individual choice.
I am not at all certain how this issue can or will be resolved. Certainly
a recognition by the medical profession of the patient's as an equal member
of society would result in reassessment of the logic of some of its objections
to some of the current proposals. A consistency in dealing with patients as
adult human beings capable of exercising independent judgment would
avoid conflicts in the contractual relationship, would minimize incurring
civil liability for invasion of patient's rights, and would provide a basis
for understanding the rationale for proposals to enable more widespread
provision of medical care. Concern for the expectations of the public might
also enable an approach to availability of medical service which might
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divert attention from the purely financial aspects to the actual rendering
of service.
We might note incidently that the one aspect of the doctor-doctor portion
of our ethical code which has been an ethical "problem" in recent years
is that which deals with the right of physicians to contract and associate as
a group in the provision of medical care. It would appear that whenever
the physician must look at his relationship to those around him in any
manner other than the classical model of the dominant actor and the sick
patient dependent upon him, we may anticipate problems, whether we
deal with individual rights of individual patients, the expectation of the
public in the provision of medical care, or variations in the contractual
relationships possible in the payment for medical care.
It was not my purpose to give any pat solution to the problems now
besetting our profession, but to provide a basis for analysis of the areas of
disagreement. In the next paper I would like to continue this type of
analysis in treating the problems inherent in the use of human beings as
experimental subjects, the artificial prolongation of life, and the care of
the terminal illness.
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